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Lauretta: Defending Second-Parent Adoptions

COMMENT
PROTECTING THE CHILD'S BEST
INTEREST:
DEFENDING SECOND-PARENT
ADOPTIONS GRANTED PRIOR TO
THE 2002 ENACTMENT OF
CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 25
INTRODUCTION

Imagine a child with two parents. Imagine a child who,
from birth, looked to these two people for support, food, shelter,
clothing, and love. This child knows that these two people are
her parents. Should something go wrong, this child will turn to
these two people for help. Yet, only one of the child's parents is
her legal parent. This child has two parents of the same-sex.
One of her mothers was artificially inseminated. The child's
other mother was there every step of the way helping the
biological parent. In every sense of the word, the nonbiological
mother is the child's parent. Yet, courts and legislatures do not
always recognize this relationship. This child's parent does not
fit neatly into the legal definition of a parent. Even though a
child has two parents, only one of them is the legal parent.
Imagine the child has started school. The teacher has
planned a field trip to the zoo. The teacher passes out
permission slips for the parents to sign. The permission slip
needs to be signed by the child's legal guardian or parent. The
child's biological parent is on a business trip and will not be
home in time to sign the permission slip. The nonbiological
parent is not the child's legal guardian. While the teacher will
accept the nonbiological parent's consent on the permission
slip, in other instances, the nonbiological parent's consent is
not enough. This one issue regarding the child's field trip is
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trivial compared to the actual legal issues facing children of
same-sex parents.
Imagine that the child is playing in the schoolyard during
the school day. The child suffers a serious injury and needs to
go to the hospital. The hospital contacts the nonbiological
mother and she meets her child at the hospital. She talks to
the doctor, the doctor informs her that the child is in need of a
medical procedure, and legal consent is required. The child's
legal mother is not in town. The child's nonbiological mother
cannot give consent. Only one parent is the child's legal
parent. Only one parent can consent to life-saving medical
procedures or portray herself as the child's legal parent.
One method in which courts have recognized the
relationship between children and their nonbiological parent is
through second-parent adoptions.
Much like stepparent
adoptions, second-parent adoptions allow the child's
nonbiological parent to become the child's legal parent. Courts
grant the adoption without severing the parental rights of the
biological parent. This concept of second-parent adoptions first
surfaced in the 1980s. 1 Second-parent adoptions have allowed
many children the benefit of having two, legally recognizable
parents. Yet, in California, the legal relationship between
children in same-sex, second-parent relationships and their
non-biological parent are in jeopardy.
A ruling by the California Court of Appeal threatens the
validity of these second-parent adoptions.
Sharon S. u.
Superior Court 2 is pending review before the California
Supreme Court. This case may nullify second-parent adoptions
granted in California prior to the enactment of Assembly Bill
25, which gave same-sex domestic partners the statutory right
to adopt their partner's children. 3 Section I will examine the
factual history and majority and minority opinions in Sharon
S. Next, Section II of this comment will survey the history of
1 The National Center for Lesbian Rights,
Second·Parent Adoptions: An
Information
Sheet,
available
at
http://www.nclrights.org/publicatons/2ndparentadoptions.htm (last updated September
2002). Id. The National Center for Lesbian Rights originated the idea of second·
parent adoptions. Id.
2 Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Cal. App. 2001) rev. granted
39 P.3d 512 (Cal. Jan. 29, 2002).
3 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002); A.B. 25, 2000·2001
regular session (CaL).
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adoption law and California Assembly Bill 25. Finally, Section
III of this comment will consider differing state court opinions
regarding second-parent adoptions. Section III will also offer
remedies to counteract potential nullification of second-parent
adoptions granted in California before January 1, 2002.

I. SHARON S. V. SUPERIOR COURT STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Sharon S. u. Superior Court concerns two women, Sharon
S. and Annette F. Annette and Sharon while attending college
and began a lesbian relationship.4 The two moved to San Diego
in 1990. 5 Annette and Sharon expressed their commitment to
each other through a commitment ceremony in 1992.6 The two
also entered a "living together agreement" in 1992.7
When the couple first decided to have children, Sharon and
Annette chose an anonymous sperm donor and Sharon was
artificially inseminated. s On October 15, 1996, Sharon gave
birth to Zachary S. 9 Annette and Sharon began adoption
proceedings shortly after Zachary's birth and the court granted
Annette's adoption petition. lO The San Diego Superior Court
allowed Annette to adopt Zachary without terminating
Sharon's parental rights.! 1
In 1998, Sharon was again
artificially inseminated with the same anonymous donor and

4 Petitioner Sharon S.'s Answer Brief on the Merits at 2·9, Sharon S. v. Superior
Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Cal. App. 2001) rev. granted 39 P.3d 512 (Cal. Jan. 29,
2002) (No. S102671) [hereinafter Sharon's Brief]. (Pagination to the brief is not
available. The brief can be found on Westlaw at 2002 WL 1926003. Citations to this
brief will refer the reader to the page range available in the brief and the Westlaw page
number.)
5 Id. and 2002 WL 1926003, at *7.
6 Id.
7 Id. A living together agreement acts like a prenuptial agreement for homosexual
couples that make a commitment to live their lives together. Rainbow Law, Living
Together Agreement, (2002), available at
http://www.rainbowlaw.com/htmls/together.html.Aliving together agreement sets
forth the property of each party to the agreement and provides for resolution of
disputes that may arise should the relationship end. Id.
S Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
9 Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2-9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at * 7.
10 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
II Real Party in Interest Annette F.'s Opening Brief on the Merits at 4-7, Sharon S.
v. Superior Court, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 107 (Cal. 2001) rev. granted 39 P.3d 512 (Jan. 29,
2002) (No. S102671), [hereinafter Annette's Brief]. (pagination to the brief is not
available. The brief can be found on Westlaw at 2002 WL 985011. Citations to thi/l
brief will refer the reader to the page range in the brief and the Westlaw page number.)
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Sharon gave birth on June 18, 1999 to Joshua S,12 In July
1999, Annette and Sharon met with an attorney so that
Annette could petition the court to adopt Joshua. 13
As with Zachary's adoption, Annette sought to adopt under
the Independent Adoption Act codified in Sections 8800
through 8823 of the California Family Code,14 When Sharon
and Annette initiated proceedings for Annette to adopt
Zachary, neither wanted Sharon's parental rights terminated.!5
Section 8617 of the California Family Code, however, requires
the court to terminate Sharon's parental rights. 16 To prevent
termination of her parental rights, Sharon filed an addendum
to the adoption agreement expressly stating that she did not
intend to terminate her parental rights.!7 Sharon intended to
retain her parental rights while concurrently conferring
parental rights to Annette. 1S Prior to granting the adoption,
the San Diego Department of Health and Human Services
submitted a report recommending that the superior court allow
Annette to adopt Joshua, finding that the adoption was in
Joshua's best interest.!9 In July 2000, incidences of violence
erupted between the couple20 and shortly thereafter, Sharon
requested that the court take the proposed adoption proceeding
off calendar,21

A. THE SUPERIOR COURT GRANTED ANNETTE'S ADOPTION
PETITION BUT THE APPELLATE COURT REVERSED

After Sharon requested the court take the adoption
proceedings off calendar, Annette filed an Order to Show Cause
seeking sole physical custody of Zachary and Joshua and filed a
Petition to Establish Parental Relationship on September 22,
12 Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2-9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at * 7; Sharon S., 113
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
13 Id. Sharon S. acknowledged she signed the fee agreement with Annette July 27,
1999 but stated she never actually met the attorney until July 14, 2000. Id.
14 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110, 112.
15 Id. at 110.
16 CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617 (West 1994).
17 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110.
18 Annette's Brief, supra note 11, at 4-7 and 2002 WL 985011, at * 8.
19 Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2-9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at * 9.
20 Id. Sharon alleged that Annette had hit her. Id. This caused Sharon to seek a
temporary restraining order from the court. Id. It was granted. Id.
21
Id.
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2000. 22 Then on October 23, 2000, Annette moved to adopt
Joshua. 23 Annette argued that the adoption was in Joshua's
best interest. She further called to the court's attention that
Sharon had not withdrawn her consent to Joshua's adoption.
Sharon did not withdraw her consent despite the fact that she
sought to take the adoption proceedings off calendar. Annette
argued that due to the doctrine of parenthood by estoppel, she
could petition to adopt Joshua. 24 Although Sharon and Annette
temporarily agreed to a custody plan, they failed to agree on a
final plan during mediation on November 2, 2000. 25 On
November 8, 2000, Sharon filed a motion to withdraw her
consent to the independent adoption. 26 On that same day, the
Department of Health and Human Services filed a
supplemental report reaffirming their finding that the adoption
was in Joshua's best interest. 27
Notwithstanding the Department's recommendation,
Sharon filed a motion to dismiss the adoption petition on
December 11, 2000. 28 Sharon argued that she did not consent
to the adoption, therefore the court could not grant Annette's
petition. 29 Since Sharon did not fully withdraw her consent,
the statutory requirements of the Independent Adoption Act
had not been met. 30 Therefore, the altered agreement was not
legally enforceable. 31 Sharon also mentioned, but did not fully
discuss that superior courts did not have the jurisdiction to
grant second-parent adoptions. 32
On March 19, 2001, the San Diego County Superior Court
granted the adoption. 33 Sharon appealed the decision. 34 On
October 2001, the appellate court reversed the trial court's
decision and denied Annette's petition for adoption. 35 The

22
23
24

25
26

27

28

29
30
31

32
33
34

35

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2·9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at *9·10.
Id. at 2·9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at *10
Id.
Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112.
Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2·9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at *10.
Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2·9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at *10.
Id. at 107.
See id. at 115·116.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

5

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4

178

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

appellate court denied the adoption because it found that the
California legislature had not previously prescribed secondparent adoptions in the adoption statutes. 36

B. THE MAJORITY STRICTLY CONSTRUED THE ADOPTION
STATUTE THEREBY DENYING ANNETTE'S PETITION FOR
ADOPTION
In reviewing the petition for adoption, the majority
examined the three types of adoptions available in Californiaagency adoption, independent adoption and stepparent
adoption. In an agency adoption, the birth parents relinquish
their parental rights to a licensed adoption agency or social
services. 37 The agency then has exclusive control to oversee the
child's adoption. 38 In an independent adoption, the birth
parents relinquish their parental rights directly to the adoptive
parent. 39
In a stepparent adoption, the spouse of the
birthparent petitions to adopt the birth parent's child without
terminating the birthparent's parental rights. 40
The appellate court decided whether a second-parent
adoption could properly proceed as an independent adoption.41
The court answered in the negative. 42 Although Annette
argued that the adoption statutes should be liberally construed
to promote the best interest of the child, the appellate court
refused to do so, thus preventing Annette from adopting
Joshua. 43 Annette relied heavily on Marshall u. Marshall,44 a
1925 California Supreme Court case that discussed stepparent
adoptions. In Marshall, the California Supreme Court liberally
construed the adoption statutes so that the natural mother's
parental rights were not terminated when the stepfather
adopted the children. 45 Even though stepparent adoptions did
36

37

38
39
40

41

42

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 111.
at 112.
at 114.

at 112, 115-116.
Marshall v. Marshall, 239 P. 36 (Cal. 1925).
45 See generally id.
In Marshall, the natural mother permitted the stepfather to
adopt the children. Id. at 237. In the adoption, the stepfather adopted the children
which caused the mother to lose her parental rights. Id. at 237. The stepfather then
43

44
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not then exist by statute, the California Supreme Court paved
the way for future legislation. 46 After Marshall, the California
legislature not only amended the independent adoption statute
but also created a new classification-stepparent adoptions. 47
The Sharon S. majority regarded the Marshall decision as
dicta and not as precedent for the court to follow. 48 The
majority reasoned that application of Marshall would
undermine the express statutory language that for a person to
adopt a child in an independent or agency adoption, the natural
parent's rights must be terminated. 49 Furthermore, courts
were not required to question legislative intent, but rather
apply the unambiguous language of the statute, which requires
termination of parental rights. 50
Based on the strict
application and construction of the Family Code, the majority
dismissed the adoption petition. 51

C. THE DISSENTING JUDGE IN SHARON S. SAW THAT GRANTING
THE ADOPTION WAS IN JOSHUA'S BEST INTEREST
Presiding Judge Kremer stated that he would have
granted Annette's adoption petition since he found Marshall
decision to be controlling. 52 Judge Kremer disagreed with the
dismissal of the adoption petition since Annette and Sharon
obviously intended the adoption to occur. 53 He argued that
dismissal of the petition affected a result so plainly opposite to
the parties' original intent. 54 According to the dissent, the
Marshall court effectively read a stepparent adoption into the
attempted to clear himself of child support obligations after his divorce from the
natural mother by allowing the mother to readopt the children. Id. at 237. The
California Supreme Court liberally construed the then existing adoption statutes by
saying that it was preposterous that the mother's parental rights would be terminated
solely because the stepfather had adopted the children. Id. at 237-238.
46 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118 (2001) (Kremer, P.J., dissenting).
47
Id.
48 Id. at 113.
49 Id. at 114.
60
Id. (discussing California Teacher Ass'n. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified
School Dist., 927 P.2d 1175 (Cal. 1997».
51 Id. at 115.
52 Id. at 116 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 118 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting) (citing Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court,
813 P.2d 240,245 n.7 (1991».
64 Id. (Kremer, P.J., dissenting) (citing Marshall, 239 P. at 767).
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statute. 55 Based on the precedent from Marshall, the Sharon
S. dissent examined the existing independent adoption
statute. 56 Through his examination, Judge Kremer liberally
construed the adoption statute to allow a second-parent
adoption to occur.57
Analogizing Marshall to Annette and Sharon's situation,
the dissent found that second-parent adoptions petitioned
through the independent adoption act are a legitimate
procedure. 58 Using the guidance of Marshall, the court
recognized the necessity to liberally construe adoption statutes
to effectuate decisions to protect the child's welfare. 59 The
guidance of Marshall and the remedies discussed in Section of
this comment, allow the California Supreme Court to preserve
those second-parent adoptions granted prior to the enactment
of California Assembly Bill 25. 60

II. BACKGROUND
A. THE STATE, NOT THE COMMON LAw, CREATED ADOPTION
LAw
An adoption recognizes a nonbiological parent as the legal
parent of the child. "Adoption, properly considered, refers to
persons who are strangers in blood."61
The relationship
formed out of an adoption "implies that the natural
relationship between the child and its parents by blood is
superceded."62 Adoption law was not known at common law,
but it was known in Roman law. 63 Since the first adoption
statute enacted by Massachusetts in 1851, state legislatures
have established adoption laws in the United States. 64
Id. at 118 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting).
Id. (Kremer, P.J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 117 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting).
58 Id. (Kremer, P.J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 117 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting) (citing Dept. of Social Welfare v. Superior
Court., 459 P.2d 897, 899 (1969».
60 A.B. 25, 2000-2001 regular session (Cal.).
California Assembly Bill 25 is
discussed in Part C of this Section.
6!
Blythe v. Ayres, 31 P. 915, 916 (Cal. 1892) (action by illegitimate child through
her mother to determine heirship and title to father's estate).
62
Estate of Dye, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362, 366 (2001) (quoting Estate of Jobson, 128 P.
938 (1912».
63 Id. at 365.
64
Karla J. Starr, Adoption by Homosexuals: A Look at Differing State Court
55
56
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Therefore, "[t]he right of adoption is wholly statutory."65
Historically, when interpreting adoption statutes, judges defer
to the plain language of the statute. 66 The judicial common law
approaches adoption laws with hostility because the state
invented the concept of adoption law. 67
Adoption law progresses with societal development and
shifts to reflect the changing societal definition of a family.68 In
the United States in 1998, there were 1,674,000 same-sex
partnerships.69 Of these partnerships, 167,000 couples were
raising children. 70 Thus, the traditional nuclear family71 is no
longer the only one that exists in today's society. More
recently, an increase in nontraditional families has lead to
heightened acceptance of gay and lesbian families. 72 Today,
only one-fourth of families fit the concept of a traditional
nuclear family.73
Today, stepparents file the majority of adoption petitions. 74
In a stepparent adoption, after the court terminates one
natural parent's parental rights, the stepparent becomes the
legally recognized parent of his or her spouse's child. 75 In a
stepparent adoption, one biological parent remains the legal
parent of the child. 76 Adoptions also occur through agency and
independent adoptions. These adoptions contrast stepparent
adoptions in one important way. Whereas one parent retains
his or her parental rights to the child in stepparent adoptions,
Opinions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1497, 1498-1499 (1998). Massachusetts was the first state
to enact an adoption statute. Id. at 1499.
65 In re Brandel's Estate, 112 P.2d 976, 977 (Cal. 1941).
66
See In re Sharon's Estate, 177 P. 283, 286 (Cal. 1918) (courts originally strictly
construed adoption statute). See also In re Crutcher, 215 P. 101, 102 (Cal 1923}.
67
Dye, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365. Starr, supra note 64, at 1499.
68 See Elizabeth A. Delaney, Note, Statutory Protection of the Other Mother: Legally
Recognizing the Relationship between the Non-Biological Lesbian Parent and her Child,
43 HAsTINGS L. REV. 177 (1991).
69 Kitty Mak, California's New Domestic Partnership Registration Act may Aid
Same-Sex Partners in Providing a Legal Basis for Their Life Relationship, L.A.
LAWYER, July/Aug. 2001, at 35.
70 See id. at 35.
71
By traditional nuclear family, this author is referring to families consisting of a
married father and mother and their children.
72
Starr, supra note 64, at 1513.
73 Id.
74 National Adoption Information Clearinghouse, State Laws Regarding Adoption
by Gay and Lesbian Parents: Second Parent Adoptions (Nov. 13, 2002) available at
http://www.calib.comlnaiclpubsll_same.cfm.
75 Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112.
76 Id.
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in independent and agency adoptions, the natural parent's
parental rights are terminated. 77 Within' these adoption
frameworks, same-sex second-parents are left with little
statutory ability to become the adoptive parent of their
partner's child.
B.

CHANGING FAMILIES HAVE PROMPTED CHANGING
ADOPTION LAws

As society has become increasingly accepting of alternative
and diverse lifestyles, courts have increased legal rights to
these newly emerging families. 78 Specifically, courts are more
often likely to grant second-parent adoptions, rather than
denying the adoptions because they do not fit into the statutory
scheme of adoptions. Courts permit second-parent adoptions
because they recognize that an adoption provides many
benefits to the family. It bestows legal protections to the
parents and child. 79 The adoption also benefits the child
psychologically. 80 The adoption gives the child security in
knowing it has two legally recognizable parents. Lastly, some
courts recognize that the adoption promotes the best interests
of the child. 81
The best interest of the child standard originated from
custody proceedings82 and is intended to "maximize a child's
opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult."83
Courts originally regarded children as property of the father
and automatically granted the father custody rights. 84 Once
courts recognized the rights of the mother, they shifted their
focus to the "tender years" presumption. With the "tender
years" presumption, when parents divorced, courts would
Id. at 111.
Delaney, supra nqte 68 , at 206-207.
79 Id. at 179.
80 Id.
8! Id. at 215.
82 Sheryl C. Sultan, Note and Comment, The Right of Homosexuals to Adopt:
Changing Legal Interpretations of ''Parent'' and ''Family,'' 10 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L 45,
59 (1995).
83 In re S.B., 2000 WL 575934, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (two siblings were placed
in foster care and were placed with two different families and one family contested
other adoption because need for siblings to remain together court found that it was in
child's best interest to continue placement with two separate families); Adoption of
Michelle T., 117 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858 (1975).
84 Sultan, supra note 82, at 59.
77

78
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presumptively grant custody to the mother if the child was of
tender years. 85
Adoption law progressed again from
automatically granting custody of a child of tender years to the
mother, to instead facilitating the best interest of the child. 86
To facilitate the best interest of the child, courts review all
relevant information available. 87 Courts consider the following
factors: the child's desires, the child's present and future need
for emotional and physical support, parental abilities and the
stability of the home. 88 These factors, however, cannot be
"ascertained by crude calculation."89 By crude calculation, the
court recognized that a rigid set of criteria for prospective
parents to fulfill would not further determination of the best
interests of the child. 90 Instead, courts should review adoption
petitions on a case-by-case basis. 91
When granting same-sex second-parent adoptions, courts
look to the participation of the partner in the child's life as well
as a bond between the child and partner. 92 Courts regard the
best interests of the child as paramount when granting
adoptions.93 Children benefit both financially and emotionally
by having two, legally recognized parents. When granting
second-parent adoptions, a majority of states and courts view
this benefit to be in the child's welfare. 94 For example,
California courts initially considered homosexual conduct as a
factor in determining the best interest of the child. 95 The
85 See Browne v. Browne, 141 P.2d 428,429 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943); Loomis v. Loomis,
201 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); Wilson v. Wilson, 13 P.2d 376, 378 (Cal. Ct. App.
1932). "As is said in Russell v. Russell, 129 P. 467, 468, 'There cannot be any fIxed and
certain age of minority which, in all cases and for all purposes, can be said to constitute
a child of "tender years'" (See also Ludlow v. Ludlow, 89 Cal. App. 2d 610, 616, 201
P.2d 579)." Denham v. Martina, 29 Cal. Rptr. 377, 379 (1963).
86 Sultan, supra note 82, at 59; Wilson v. Wilson, 13 P.2d at 378.
87 In re Adoption of Hess, 562 A.2d 1375, 1380-1381 (pa. Super. 1989) (evidence
from grandparents, along with adoption agency's fIndings, was needed to make a
decision in the best interest of the child).
88 McGuire v. Brown, 580 S.W.2d 425,429 (Tex. App. 1979).
89 In re S.B., 2000 WL 575934, at *3. See also Adoption of Michelle T., 44 Cal. App.
3d 699, 704. "The best interest of the child is an elusive guideline that belies rigid
defInition." Id.
90 In re S.B., 2000 WL 575934, at *3
91 Id.
92 In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535,539 (N.J. Super. 1995).
93 In re Adoption of Bird, 6 Cal. Rptr. 675, 679 (1960) (citing In re Hickson, 40 Cal.
App. 2d 89, 92).
94
Starr, supra note 64, at 1499.
95 Chaffin v. Frye, 119 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25 (1975). "In exercising a choice between
homosexual and heterosexual households for purposes of child custody a trial court

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 4

184

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

courts in California, however, no longer follow this standard. 96
Conversely, Florida prohibits homosexuals from adopting.97
Utah prohibits cohabitating, non-married couples from
adopting children. 98 Yet, aNew Jersey court acknowledged
that no inherent difference exists between homosexual parents
and heterosexual parents, thereby refusing to tacitly support
the unfounded stereotypes held by people against same sex
parents. 99
In Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G.,lOO the New
Jersey superior court granted a same-sex, second-parent
adoption petition by a non-biological mother.101 In granting the
adoption, the court first looked to the concerns voiced by other
could conclude that permanent residence in a homosexual household would be
detrimental to the children and contrary to their best interests." Id at 26.
96 In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (1988) (In custody dispute after
parents' divorce, mother attempted to bar father from having overnight visits because
father was a homosexual. Id. at 288. The court vacated the order of the trial court
that prevented the father from the child being in the presence of any homosexual friend
or acquaintance of the father. Id. at 291. The fact that the father is homosexual does
not automatically create a presumption that father is unfit to care for his child. Id. at
289.
97
Debra Caraaquillo Hedges, Note, The Forgotten Children: Same·Sex Partners,
Their Children, and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C.L. REV. 883, 894. See FL ST §
63.042(3): "No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a
homosexual." Id.
98 Hedges, supra note 97, at 896. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78·30·9 (2001): "(3)(a) The
Legislature specifically finds that it is not in a child's best interest to be adopted by a
person or persons who are cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and
binding marriage under the laws of this state. Nothing in this section limits or
prohibits the court's placement of a child with a single adult who is not cohabiting as
defined in Subsection (3)(b); (3)(b) For purposes of this section, 'cohabiting' means
residing with another person and being involved in a sexual relationship with that
person." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78·30·9 .. The Utah State Legislature added the provision
prohibiting non· marital couples to adopt children in March 2000. Hedges, supra note
97, at 896. The Utah legislature added this provision soon after New Hampshire lifted
its ban on adoptions by homosexuals. Id. While the Utah statutes does not expressly
prohibit same· sex couples from adoption, since same· sex couples do not have the option
to marry, this code does prevent them from adopting children if they lived together in a
committed relationship. Id. While the Utah statute this statute does not expressly
prohibit same· sex couples to adopt, the state legislature only recently added in the
provision about non·marital, cohabitating couples from adoption in March 2000, soon
after New Hampshire repealed its statute prohibiting homosexuals from adoption. Id.
While nonmarital, cohabitating couples include both heterosexual and homosexual
couples, homosexual couples do not have the opportunity to marry legally and therefore
are disparately impacted by Utah's legislation. See id. at 901·902.
99 Sonja J. Larsen, J.D., Adoption of Child by Same·Sex Partners, 27 A.L.R. 5th 54,
65 (1995) (discussing Matter of the Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550 (N.J.
Super. 1993».
100 Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550
101 Id. at 555.
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courts that the children of same-sex partnerships would face
harassment from the children's peers.1 02 The court refused to
bolster the notion that denying the adoption petition would
save the child from this perceived harassment. 103 The evidence
before the court demonstrated that the adoption would promote
the best interest of the child, regardless of the parents' sexual
orientation. 104 The court implied that children in homosexual
households do not differ from children in heterosexual
households. 105
The American Academy of Pediatrics unequivocally
supported the holding of the New Jersey court when it
announced its landmark policy towards gay and lesbian
parents in February 2002.1 06 The American Academy of
Pediatrics stated that gay and lesbian parents possess the
desire to have and raise children just as heterosexual parents
possess the desire to have and raise children.l° 7 In fact,
children of gay and lesbian parents have some advantages over
children of heterosexual parents, namely that children of samesex parents tolerate diversity more than children of
heterosexual parents do.1 08 Further, "[d]enying legal parent
status through adoption to coparents or second-parents
prevents these children from enjoying the psychologic and legal
security that comes from having two willing, capable, and
loving parents."109

Id. at 552.
Id.
104 Id. at 554.
105
Id.
106
See Committee on Psychosocial Aspect of Child and Family Health, Coparent or
Second-parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 Am. Acad, of Pediatrics, Feb. 2002
at 339 [hereinafter Child and Family Health Comm.] available at
http://www.aap.org/policy/020008.html.SeealsoEllenC.Perrin.MD. et aI, Technical
Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 Am. Acad. of
at
341
[hereinafter
Perrin]
available
at
Pediatrics,
Feb.
2002,
http://www.aap.org/policy/020008t.html.
107 Perrin, supra note 106, at 341-344.
108 Id. Besides being more tolerant to diversity, children of gay and lesbian parents
are also found to be more nurturing of younger children, more affectionate, and
responsive whereas children of heterosexual children were seen as domineering, bossy
and negative. Id. Children of gay and lesbian parents had higher self esteem and were
more open to the possibility of having a same-sex partner, yet the proportion of gay and
lesbian children raised by gay and lesbian parents were the same proportions of gay
and lesbian children raised by heterosexual parents. Id.
109 Child and Family Health Comm., supra note 106, at 339-340.
102

103
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With the sharp rise in nontraditional families and their
increased acceptance, families have turned to the courts to
obtain legal protection and rights. Slowly adoption law has
evolved to meet the changing shape offamilies. llo Not only has
homosexuality been removed in many states as a bar to
adoption, but also courts and legislatures consider homosexual
parents equally capable as heterosexual parents in having and
raising well-adjusted children. The increased acceptance has
led states, like California, to pass legislation that recogmzes
the right of nonbiological parents to adopt.
C. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY BILL 25 LEGALLY RECOGNIZES
SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS GRANTED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2002.

The California legislature furthered the evolution of
adoption law by enacting California Assembly Bill 25 for the
regular 2000-2001 session.l ll California Assembly Bill 25 is a
collection of changes to existing state law that conferred a
number of rights on registered domestic partners. 1l2 California
recognized domestic partnerships in 1999 with the enactment
of Section 297 of the Family Code.1 13 California now legally
recognizes domestic partners in part due to the increase in and
acceptance of, cohabitating, nonmarital couples. 1l4 Thus, a
See generally Delaney, supra note 68.
See A.B. 25, 2000·2001 regular session (Cal.).
112
When Governor Gray Davis signed this piece of legislation, he issued the
following statement: "To the Members of the California Legislature: I am signing
Assembly Bill 25 which would enable domestic partners to make medical decisions for
incapacitated loved ones, adopt their partner's child, use sick leave to care for their
partner, recover damages for wrongful death, and allow the right to be named a
conservator of a will. In California, a legal marriage is between a man and a woman. I
believe the only things that can undermine the bonds of a strong marriage are
ignorance and fear. This legislation does nothing to contradict or undermine the
definition of a legal marriage, nor is it about special rights. It is about civil rights,
respect, responsibility, and, most of all, it is about family. Therefore, I am honored to
sign one of the strongest domestic partner laws in the nation. Sincerely, GRAY
DAVIS." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.01 (West Supp. 2002). This author will not comment
on the political reasons Governor Davis signed Assembly Bill 25, but this statement
sees the need to recognize all families, not just the traditional family with two
heterosexual parents.
113
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2002). When examining Section 297, it would
seem to this author the main purpose of this statute would be to allow two mutual
caring adults to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship.
114 Grace Ganz Blumberg, Article, The Regulation of Nonmarital Cohabitants:
Rights and Responsibilities of the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1265, 1296 (2001).
110
111
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domestic partnership is a new legal status that contains some
of the legal rights of marriage and yet, it still falls short of its
definition,115 most importantly a marriage can only occur
between a man and a woman. 116
One of the rights gained by same-sex domestic partners
through the Assembly Bill 25's amendment to Section 9000 of
the California Family Code is the right for a registered
domestic partner to adopt the child of his or her registered
domestic partner without terminating the rights of the
biological parent,l17 In essence, the statute allows same-sex
domestic partners to seek stepparent adoptions. Prior to the
changes to Section 9000 of the California Family Code, courts
granted same-sex, second-parent adoptions under a number of
doctrines, including in loco parentis,118 de facto parenthood,119
and intended parentage. 120 Courts relied on these doctrines
because they lacked the statutory ability to grant secondparent adoptions to same-sex couples. In loco parentis, de facto
parenthood and intended parentage contributed to the
evolution of adoption law and the enactment of California
Assembly Bill 25.
"A California appellate court has described the concept of
in loco parentis in the following terms:
[A] person who has put himself in the situation of a lawful
parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental
relationship, without going through the formalities necessary
to legal adoption, ... stand[s] in loco parentis, and the rights,
duties and liabilities of such person are the same as those of
the lawful parent."

Id. at 1272.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5. (West Supp. 2000). This comment will not explore the
similarities and differences in heterosexual marriages and domestic partners except for
the ability to adopt under Section 9000 of the California Family Code.
ll7
Note the parallelism in subparts (a) and (b) of Section 9000 of the Family Code:
(a) A stepparent desiring to adopt a child of the stepparent's spouse may for that
purpose file a petition in the county in which the petitioner resides. (b) A domestic
partner, as defined in Section 297, desiring to adopt a child of his or her domestic
partner may for that purpose file a petition in the county in which the petitioner
resides. In substituting the language for stepparent with domestic partner, the
California legislature has legally recognized second-parent adoptions by same-sex
partners. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 9000.
118 See Delaney, supra note 68, at 187-188.
119 Id. at 188.
120 Mak, supra note 69, at 40.
115

116
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A court first applied the common law doctrine of in loco
parentis to a same-sex, second-parent adoption in 1991.1 21
Courts most often apply this doctrine in stepparent
adoptions. 122 In loco parentis adoptions provide a viable option
for same-sex parents because this doctrine allows the secondparent to become a legal parent without divesting the biological
parent of his or her rights. 123
A de facto parent is one who assumes the role of a
parent. 124
Courts also consider de facto parents as
psychological parents. 125 "A psychological parent fulfills not
only the child's physical needs, but also the child's
psychological
needs
through
continuing
interaction,
companionship, interplay and emotional mutuality on a day to
day basis."126 Same-sex couples seeking to adopt under the de
facto parenthood doctrine, however, have recognized the
ineffectiveness of this doctrine. 127 De facto parenthood fails to
give nonbiological parents equal rights with the biological
parent. 12B De facto parents do not receive legal rights over the
child. 129
The doctrine of intended parentage bestows legal rights on
the gay or lesbian partner of the biological parent in two
ways.130 First, if the nonbiological partner jointly decides with
the biological parent to conceive a child through artificial
insemination, the nonbiological parent can obtain a pre-birth
declaration of parentage from the court.131 Second, if the
nonbiological parent assists the biological parent in finding a
surrogate mother to conceive their child, the nonbiological
121
Id. at 195; Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1991) (Nancy S. arose out
of a custody dispute involving two lesbian parents who decided to have one of the
women become artificially inseminated. Id. at 213. "[I[n loco parentis has been used to
impose the same rights and obligations imposed by statutory and common law upon
parents." Id. at 217. The court was unwilling to extend this doctrine to the
nonbiological mother in this case. Id. at 219.)
122 Delaney, supra note 68, at 194.
123
Id.
124 Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
125 Delaney, supra note 68, at 202; In re B.G., 523 P. 2d 224 (Cal. 1974).
126 Vanessa
L. Warznski, Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: The
"Psychological Parent" Standard, 39 VILL. L. REV. 737, 748 (1994).
127 Delaney. supra note 68, at 19l.
128
Id.
129 Id. at 190.
130 Mak, supra note 69, at 40.
131 Id.
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parent can obtain a pre-birth declaration of parentage from the
court. 132
In both of these methods, the nonbiological and
biological parents participate in raising the child and provide
the child with emotional and financial support.
Same-sex parents, however, no longer rely on these
methods. When the California legislature allowed for samesex, domestic partners to register with the state, the author of
that bill noted that the amendments were "designed to
strengthen, protect, and promote committed family
relationships." 133 Allowing same-sex couples to adopt each
other's child legally protects the family relationship and
extends the idea to promote committed family relationships.
The California legislature indicated they passed Assembly Bill
25, in part, because same-sex couples and their children needed
proper legal protections. 134
California adoption law has evolved with the statutory
ability for registered domestic partners to legally adopt their
partner's children. 135 Same-sex couples no longer need the
doctrines of in loco parentis, de facto parenthood, and intended
parentage because Section 9000 of the California Family Code
allows second -parent adoptions by registered domestic
partners. California public policy recognizes that the parentchild relationship consists of the conduct of the parent and the
bond between parent and child rather than the blood
relationship. 136 The only problem remaining is the validity of
second-parent adoptions granted before enactment of Assembly
25 challenged by the decision in Sharon S. v. Superior Court.

III. ANALYSIS
A.

GRANTING SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS ABSENT EXPRESS
STATUTORY LANGUAGE

Trial courts in California have granted approximately
10,000 to 20,000 second-parent adoptions over the past fifteen
Id.
Committee Report for 1999 California Senate Bill No. 75, 1999·2000 regular
session (Aug. 30, 1999) [hereinafter SB 75 Comm. Report].
134 Committee Report for 2001 California Assembly Bill No. 25, 2000·2001 regular
session (Apr. 18,2001) [hereinafter AB 25 Comm. Report].
135 CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000.
136 In re Jerry P., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 141 (2002).
132

133
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years.1 37 Sharon S. questioned the validity of second-parent
adoptions.1 38 Because establishment of a domestic partnership
was not available when courts first granted same-sex, secondparent adoptions,139 the Sharon S. decision has placed the legal
status of those adoptions at risk.14° Jordan Blum, staff
attorney for the San Diego office of the American Civil
Liberties Union notes that second-parent adoptions, where the
partners may have moved out of state and cannot establish
California residency are in peril.141 He further stated that
children whose birth parents have died face difficulty if the
court deems that the second-parent adoptions have no legal
merit.142 Thus, the child would essentially be an orphan. 143
Moreover, nullification of these adoptions would place the child
in financial jeopardy.1 44 The court can avert the situation
children will find themselves in by liberally constructing the
adoption statutes and granting second-parent adoptions.1 45
In states that strictly construct adoption statutes, the
courts defer to the plain language of the statute. 146 Even if a
statute does not promote the justice the court desires, the
statute requires the court to follow its language. 147 Courts

137 Bob Egelko, Big Adoption Issue goes to High Court-Same Sex families to be
affected, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 2002, at Al ("vast majority of these adoptions [are) by
same sex couples).
138
See Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107.
139 Since the amendment to § 9000 of the California Family Code was enacted on
January 1, 2002, only those domestic partners who had or have registered as domestic
partners pursuant to § 297 of the Family Code are statutorily eligible to adopt the
biological children of their partner. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 9000.
140 Lambda Legal, California Supreme Court to Review Second Parent Adoption
Decision, Lambda Legal Press Release (Jan. 30, 2002) available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi·binliowaldocuments/record?record=987
[hereinafter
Lambda Legal Jan. 30, 2002).
141 Lambda Legal, Civil Rights Groups Denounce Court Decision in Second Parent
Adoptions, Lambda Legal Press Release (Oct. 26, 2001) available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi·binliowaldocuments/record?record=907
[hereinafter
Lambda Legal Oct. 26, 2001).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
See generally Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116·120 (Kremer, P.J, dissenting).
146 Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374,378 (Neb. 2002).
147
See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212. ("We agree ... that the absence of
any legal formalization of her relationship to the children has resulted in a tragic
situation ... [w)e do not, however agree that the only way to avoid such an unfortunate
situation is for the courts to adopt appellant's novel theory by which a nonparent can
acquire the rights of a parent." Id. at 219.
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must strictly construe the adoption statutes.l 48 Yet, courts do
not always follow this mandate.l 49 To act in the best interest of
the child, courts liberally construe adoption law to conform to
the courts' sense of justice. 150 While some courts do not always
strictly construe adoption statutes, a California court warned
against "ingenious" interpretation of the adoption statutes. 151
The court may not create ambiguity in the statute order to
achieve the result it desires but should interpret adoption
statutes in such a way to leave no ambiguity for later courts.152
Further, the court should act in the best interest of the child. 153
To validate the second-parent adoptions granted before
January 1, 2002, the California Supreme Court must liberally
construe the adoption statutes. In examining this proposition,
a look at sister states strengthens the trend to liberally
construe adoption statutes.
States that strictly construe
adoption statutes and deny adoptions based on the parent's
sexual orientation ignore evidence that sexual orientation does
not detriment a child. 154
Whereas, states that liberally
construe adoption statutes are able to grant adoptions that
promote the best interest of the child, regardless of the parent's
sexual orientation. 155
1. Denying Adoption Petitions Based on the Sexual Orientation

of the Parents Hinders the Promotion of the Best Interest of the
Child.
When acting in the best interest of the child, judges should
base their decision on the home the parents provide for the
child, not the sexual orientation or marital status of the

148 Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d at 377. ''The matter of adoption is statutory, and
the manner of procedure and terms are all specifically prescribed and must be
followed." Id.
149 In re Interest of Peter Hart and George Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1183 (Del. Fam. Ct.
2001).
150 Id. at 1185 (In an action involving a same-sex, second-parent adoption, the court
said, "[I]t is inconceivable to conclude, given the statutory mandate to read the statute
in the best interest of children, that our Legislature would have meant to exclude
loving and nurturing two parent homes .... " Jd.)
151 Adoption of Thevenin, 11 Cal. Rptr. 219, 222 (1961).
152 Id.
163

[d.

154

See Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998).
See Adoption of EOG, 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th 262 (1993).

155
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parents.1 56 No inherent difference exists between children
raised in homosexual or heterosexual households.1 57 It is not
the sexual orientation of the parent, but the quality of the
home life, that judges should examine. In the states that do
not expressly prohibit homosexuals to adopt, many courts have
not allowed the sexual orientation of the parents to preclude
such homosexual adoptions.1 58 In Adoption of EOG, the court
decided whether an adoption by a homosexual was in the best
interest of the child. 159 From the outset, the Pennsylvania
court stated that the judges' own personal biases and
standpoints towards a homosexual lifestyle could not mar the
court's judgment. 16o The EOG court granted the adoption
based on the extensive evidence that the adoption was in the
best interest of the child. 161 The decision by the court to put
aside its personal feelings about homosexual parents contrasts
with the reasoning used by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex
Parte J.M.F.162
In Ex Parte J.M.F., a case involving the potential
termination of the biological mother's parental rights by way of
stepparent adoption, the court openly disapproved of the
mother's lifestyle.1 63
Based on trial court findings, the
Alabama Supreme Court said that a lesbian mother wrongfully
portrayed to her children that a homosexual partnership was
the moral and social equivalent of a heterosexual marriage. 164
The court refused to support this illegal and immoral
relationship despite the evidence that the mother may have
been a good parent. 165 The court instead granted custody to the
father and remanded the case back to the trial court to
determine the issue of visitation. 166 The court placed the child

Delaney, supra note 68, at 215.
See Child and Family Health Comm., supra note 106, at 339·340; see also Perrin,
supra note 106, at 341·344.
158
See Adoption of Charles B., 552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990); Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d
799 (Va. 1993); Adoption of EOG, 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th 262.
159 Adoption of EOG, 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 265, 269.
160 Id. at 265.
161
Id. at 269.
162
Compare Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190 with Adoption of EOG, 28 Pa. D. & C.
4th 262.
163 Ex Parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d at 1196.
164 Id. at 1195.
165
Id. at 1196.
166 [d.
156
157
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in a household with her biological father and stepmother where
the two advanced view that a heterosexual marriage is the
societal and moral norm.167 The court focused on the sexual
orientation of the parents, rather than the relationship
between the mother and child.
Recognizing the need to focus on the best interest of the
child, instead of the parent's sexual orientation, is pivotal in
extending current California state law to those adoptions that
may be adversely affected by the Sharon S. decision. State
courts, which deny second-parent adoptions, more often
disapprove of the parent's sexual orientation instead of looking
at the parental abilities of the homosexual parent.168 Whereas
state courts which have granted second-parent adoptions, do so
based on the parental abilities of the parent. 169 The courts
which grant same-sex, second-parent adoptions recognize that
granting the second-parent adoption promotes the best interest
of the child, absent express statutory language otherwise
permitting such adoptions.
State courts refusing to consider whether the prospective
adoptive parent acts in the best interest of the child blatantly
deny the legislative purpose of the adoption statutes. In
Adoption of Luke,170 the Nebraska Supreme Court failed to
consider this evidence and produced a result counter to the
child's best interest. For an adoption petition to be successful
in Nebraska, the petitioner must fulfill four factors.1 71 These
four factors include an inquiry into whether the petitioner is
eligible to adopt, whether the child is eligible for adoption,
whether the parties complied with the applicable statues, and
whether the adoption was in the child's best interest.1 72 The
[d. at 1195.
See generally id.
169
See generally cases cited supra note 158.
170 Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374.
171 [d. at 378.
172 Id. at 377. The Nebraska legislature does not bar homosexuals from adopting.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43·109. An unmarried person is eligible to adopt. NEB. REV. STAT. §
43-101. In Adoption of Luke, the parties underwent a home study to determine if the
child's best interest would be promoted by the adoption. Adoption of Luke, N.W.2d at
377. The adoption specialist, who conducted the study, recommended the adoption. Id.
However, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to liberally construe the adoption
statutes and grant the second-parent adoption. Id. The Court held that the limited
relinquishment of parental rights insufficiently followed the requirements of the
statute. [d. The court briefly mentioned that the adoption specialist recommended the
adoption and that the adoption has to be in the best interest of the child. [d.
167

168
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court considered all four factors as having equal weight.
Noncompliance with one factor barred the adoption petition.
The parties did not comply with the adoption statutes because
the statute required that the biological parent terminate her
parental rights so that the nonbiological parent could adopt the
child.173 Although a home study noted that the adoption would
be in the child's best interest, the court could not overlook the
fact that the parties did not comply with the adoption
statutes.l 74 Equating whether the adoption occurs in the best
interest of the child with the need for strict construction of the
adoption statute, the court defeated the adoption statutes'
objective to act in the best interest of the child. Adherence to
this view by the California Supreme Court will jeopardize the
thousands of children who enjoy the legal protection from a
same-sex, second-parent.l 75 The child in Adoption of Luke lost
the benefit of having two legally recognized parents. A
household with two legally recognized parents provides more
benefits to a child 176 than a household with only one legally
recognized parent-a result of strict construction of adoption
statutes. Permitting same-sex second-parent adoptions affords
the child the benefits to a child to have two, legally sanctioned
parents.
Both the Nebraska and Pennsylvania state legislatures,
like other state legislatures, discourage "absurd" results arising
from construction of the adoption statutes.l 77 In Nebraska, the
court determined that allowing a second-parent adoption would
lead to an absurd result while a Pennsylvania court found that
not granting the second-parent adoption petition would lead to
an absurd result. 178 Strict construction should not obstruct
fostering families with two adults who want to raise children.
Failure to allow second-parent adoptions that occurred before
January 1, 2002 will produce an equally absurd result.
173
174

Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d at 377,383.
Id. at 376. The parents did not have another option in which to adopt the child.

See generally id.
Lambda Legal Jan. 30, 2002, supra note 140.
See PARENTING OUR CHILDREN: IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE NATION, U.S.
COMMISSION ON CHILD AND FAMILY WELFARE, (1996), at 11. While this report
discusses heterosexual relationship, it does argue that children brought up in two·
parent households have a better advantage. See generally id.
177 Adoption of Luke, 40 N.W.2d at 382; In re Adoption of RB.F., 803 A.2d 1195,
1202 (Pa. 2002).
178 Adoption of Luke, 40 N.W.2d at 382; Adoption ofR.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1230.
175

176
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Thousands of children will be left without one of their legal
parents.1 79 It would be illogical for the California Supreme
Court to sever a parent-child relationship because the
legislature, at the time, had not expressly permitted it. The
California legislature passed California Assembly Bill 25 to
recognize the benefit children enjoy by having a legally
recognized relationship.180

2. Granting Same-Sex Second-parent Adoptions Based on
Legislative Intent and Existing Statutory Framework
Through liberal construction of its adoption statutes, other
state courts have been able to grant same-sex, second-parent
The
adoptions absent explicit language in the statute.
approach by state courts, such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, and New York recognizes the need to act in the
child's best interest. As already seen, the New Jersey court
refused to tacitly support biases held against homosexual
parents when an adoption would be in the child's best
interest.1 81 A Pennsylvania court refused to construe its
adoption statutes in a way that prevented second-parents from
adopting. 182 These two courts offer guidance to the decision
before the California Supreme Court that could possibly nullify
second-parent adoptions that were granted before January 1,
2002. Likewise, Delaware and New Jersey courts offer even
more guidance for the California Supreme Court. A Delaware
court granted an adoption because the legislature intended
that an adoption occur in the best interest of the child. 183 A
New York court granted a second-parent adoption by searching
for a statutory scheme to model. 184 By liberally constructing
adoption statutes, some sister states grant same-sex secondparent adoptions, a method the California Supreme Court
should also employ.

179

180
181
182
183
184

Lambda Legal Oct. 26, 2001, supra note 14l.
A.B. 25, 2000-2001 regular session (Cal.)
Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d at 55l.
Adoption ofR.B.F., 803 A.2d at 1202.
Interest of Hart, 808 A.2d at 1183 n.5.
Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 399 (N.Y. 1995)
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a. State Legislatures Intend that Courts Grant Adoption
Petitions to Promote the Best Interest of the Child.
The Family Court of Delaware approved a second-parent
adoption, noting it was in the best interest of the child in In re
Interest of Peter Hart and George Hart.185 The court found the
plaintiffs, homosexual partners, to be exemplary parents. The
codified adoption statute, however, obstructed granting of the
adoption petition. 186
The Delaware legislature had not
provided for second-parent adoptions when drafting the
adoption statutes.1 87 In granting the adoption, the Court had
to choose between strictly construing the statute and ignoring
the overwhelming evidence that the adoption promoted the
best interest of the child. 188
The court bypassed the
requirement that courts strictly interpret adoption statutes
since they were unknown at common law.1 89 Since the statute
did not directly address second-parent adoption, the court could
reach two differing conclusions as to whether to permit the
adoption. 190 To harmonize the two possible outcomes, the court
investigated the legislative intent and applied the construction
that fulfills the purpose to act in the best interest of the
child.1 91 The legislature's purpose in the adoption statute is to
act in the best interest of the child; the common law rule
requires judges to strictly construe adoption statutes. Thus,
applying the legislative purpose, rather than the common law
rule, Delaware courts can grant second-parent adoptions that
are not expressly allowed for in the statute.
185 Interest of Hart, 808 A.2d 1179. Gene Hart adopted the two children, biological
brothers, in the action after first being the children's foster parent. Id. at 1180. Gene
Hart was in a relationship with Burke Shiri. Id. at 1182. The two men had lived
together in a committed relationship for twenty· two years. Id. Gene adopted Peter in
1999 and George in April 2001. Id. In June 2001, Gene's partner, Burke, filed
petitions in the Delaware Family Court so that he could be become the legal parent
alongside Gene. Id. at 1182. Numerous reports and affidavits exemplified that
adoption by Burke was in the best interest of the children. Id. at 1188-1190. Although
the babies were born addicted to cocaine, through the parenting of Burke and Gene the
children thrived in their new environment despite the substantial obstacles in their
way. See id.
186 Id. at 1183.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
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In California, the legislature's purpose can be found in
Section 8612 of the California Family Code.1 92 Section 8612
allows an adoption to be granted if the court is satisfied that
the adoption will promote the best interest of the child. 193
Based on California Family Code § 8612, California courts have
repeatedly acted in the best interest of the child. 194 In Sharon
S., the Department of Health and Human Services twice found
that granting Annette's adoption petition would be in the best
interest of the child. 195
Even after Sharon received a
temporary restraining order against Annette, the Department
of Health and Human Services still recommended the adoption
because it found that it furthered the children's best interest to
have Annette as a legally recognized adoptive parent.1 96
With thousands of second-parent adoptions at stake in
California, courts must apply the legislative purpose to act in
the best interest of the child. Failure to do so may result in
nullification ofthese adoptions.1 97 The potential nullification of
these adoptions runs counter to the legislative purpose. 19S
Dissolving the parental rights of second-parents will leave the
intended beneficiaries of the adoption statute-the childrenwithout the emotional, financial and psychological benefits
they receive through the adoption.1 99 Such ramifications are
not in the best interest of the child and would defeat, rather
than promote, the legislative purpose to act in the best interest
of the child.
b. Existing Statutory Framework Allows Second-Parent
Adoptions To Be Granted
Another method by which the California Supreme Court
can reaffIrm the second-parent adoptions granted prior to
January 1, 2002, is to review whether other instances exist in

CAL. FAM. CODE § 8612 (c) (West 1994).
Id.
194 See generally Henwood's Guardianship, 320 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1958); Adoption of Lenn
E., 227 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1986); Adoption of McDonald, 274 P.2d 860 (Cal. 1954); Adoption
of Thevenin, 11 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1961).
195 Sharon's Brief, supra note 4, at 2-9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at *7.
196 Id.
197 Lambda Legal Oct. 26, 2001, supra note 14l.
198 Id.
199 Delaney, supra note 68, at 177.
192
193
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which an adoption can occur without severing parental rights.
In Matter of Jacob,20o the New York Court of Appeals first
noted that it must liberally construe the adoption statutes in
order to discharge the legislative purpose to act in the best
interest of the child. 201 The court then realized that following
the mandate to strictly construe the adoption statute could
place potential adoptive parents in a "Catch-22."202 Even
though both the biological and nonbiological parent choose to
co-parent the child, the courts are prohibited from allowing the
nonbiological parent to become the child's legal parent without
severing the right of the child's biological parent. 203 To grant
the second-parent adoption, the court looked to other statutory
schemes that allow adoption of a child without severing the
natural parent's parental rights.204
In New York, stepparent adoptions, underage father
adoptions, or open adoptions occur without severing the
parental rights of the natural parents. 205 Based on the three
statutory schemes, the court determined that one person could
obtain legal, parental rights without severing the natural
parent's right.206 The court then took its reasoning one step
further and held that the court could grant a second-parent
adoption.207 Before the decision in Matter of Jacob, secondparents faced the possibility that their New York adoption
petitions would be deemed invalid. 208 By liberally constructing
adoptions, the Jacob court allowed parents who adopted their
partner's biological child to remain the child's parent.
In New York, the Jacob Court looked for a legislative
scheme that allowed adoptions to occur without terminating
existing parental rights. To determine if a second-parent
adoption was possible before January 1, 2002, the California
Supreme Court should also look for an existing statutory
scheme that allows the biological parent to retain parental
Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 399.
See generally id.
202 Id at 401.
203 Id.
Upon birth, the child's biological mother is considered the child's legal
parent. Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 404. Open adoptions occur in agency placements where the birth parent
will retain post adoption contact with the child. Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 405.
208 Id.
200
20}
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rights in a second-parent adoption. In California, a legislative
scheme does exist through stepparent adoptions. 209 Using the
method by New York, California can grant second-parent
adoptions based on statutory framework already existing that
recognizes some adoptions occur without terminating the rights
of the biological parent.
California courts should follow the example set by the New
York court. The New York legislature failed to provide for
second-parent adoptions. The California legislature, until
2002, similarly failed to provide for second-parent adoptions.
All California adoptions predating January 1, 2002, face an
identical dilemma as the parties in Matter of Jacob faced. 210
Had the New York Court of Appeals denied the same-sex,
second-parent adoption petition, the legal status of previous
second-parent adoptions would have been affected. 211 The
Jacob court did not want to deprive the children at issue from
having two legally recognizable parents. 212 The New York
court did not rewrite the statutes when deciding whether to
grant the adoption. 213 It looked to the intent of the legislature
and the language of the statute. 214 The intent of the legislature
was to act in the child's best interest. 215 The language did not
expressly forbid homosexual women from adopting a child. 216
Like New York, California does not forbid a homosexual person
from adopting a child. 217 Further, the purpose of the adoption
statute is to act in the best interest of the child. 218 The New
York court granted the adoption because no express language
in the statutes prohibited it. 219 Since January 1, 2002,
California expressly allows second-parent adoptions through
the enactment of California Assembly Bill 25; such previously
granted adoptions can be achieved and are not counter to the
language of adoption statutes. 220
209

210
211

212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8548, 9000 (West 1994).
Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 405.
[d.
[d.
[d.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000.
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Further, the California legislature broadened the
legislative scheme to include adoptions by same-sex, registered
domestic partners. 221
The California legislature defined
domestic partner as "two adults who have chosen to share one
another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship of
mutual caring."222 The definition may accurately describe the
relationship status of same-sex couples when they decided to
either have a child or have the non-biological parent adopt the
child. 223 Courts grant adoptions in the best interest of the
child;224 the state legislature requires adoptions to promote the
interest of the child. 225 Liberal construction of section 9000 of
the Family Code, in light of the mandate to operate in the best
interest of the child, highlights the intent of the state
legislature to allow same-sex, registered domestic partners to
adopt their partners biological children. Society has slowly
accepted the changing family lifestyle226 and the legislature
only recently amended the Family Code to reflect this
change. 227 The Delaware and New York courts had less
statutory direction from the legislature when they granted
second-parent adoptions than do the California courts. Liberal
construction of the adoption statute lends itself to an outcome
that neither creates ambiguity nor misconstrues the statute,
but rather fits into the legislative scheme and more
importantly, promotes the best interest of the child.

221
See id.; see also A.B. 25, 2000-2001 regular session (Cal.)
"This bill would
authorize the employment of procedures applicable to stepparent adoption to the
adoption by a domestic partners, as defined, of the child of his or her domestic partner."

Id.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.
See generally, Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (women had performed a commitment
ceremony in 1969 and decided to have two children together through artificial
insemination prior to split in 1985); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1990).
224
See generally case cited, supra note 194.
225
CAL. FAM. CODE § 8612(c).
226
Delaney, supra note 68, at 206.
227 A.B. 25, 2000-2001 regular session (Cal.)
222

223

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss2/4

28

Lauretta: Defending Second-Parent Adoptions

2003] DEFENDING SECOND PARENT ADOPTIONS

201

B. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS TO GRANT
SECOND-PARENT ADOPTIONS ABSENT EXPLICIT AUTHORIZATION
FROM THE STATE LEGISLATURE.

Thousands of second-parent adoptions face potential
nullification in the state of California. 228 When deciding the
outcome of Sharon S. u. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court should decide whether California's superior
courts had the jurisdiction to grant second-parent adoptions
before January 1, 2002. 229 If the superior courts did have
jurisdiction to grant the adoptions, further challenges to these
thousand adoptions would not face the challenges they
currently do. If not, further judicial action or legislative decree
must be set forth to keep these adoptions from being
overturned in the future. California's superior courts have
jurisdiction to grant adoptions so long as the child or the
adoptive parent was domiciled in the state at the time of the
adoption proceeding. 230
Although the state legislature
statutorily mandates adoptions, they occur by judicial decree. 231
Therefore, superior courts have the authority to grant
adoptions as they see fit. The California Superior courts had
the authority to grant the 10,000 to 20,000 adoptions facing
possible nullification. 232 These courts acted in the best interest
of the child233 because this standard has been established by
the legislature and is followed by the courtS. 234 Judges usually
construe the statutes liberally in order to effectuate acting in
the best interest of the child. 235 Regardless of the outcome of
the Sharon S. case, liberal construction of the Independent
Egelko, supra note 137 at AI.
In Sharon S., neither Sharon nor Annette raised the issue of jurisdiction of the
superior courts to grant second-parent adoptions. Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
The majority noted that the jurisdiction of the superior courts might not have been
valid. Id. However, since the neither party argued the issue in their briefs, the court
chose not to discuss this issue. Id.
230 10 Witkin Parent & Child § 29 (a) (1) (1990) (citing Rest. 2d, Conflict of Laws §
78; Estate of Smith, 86 Cal. App. 2d 456, 468, 195 P.2d 842 (1948); see 33 A.L.R.3d 176)
228
229

[d. at § 29 (a) (3).
See generally Sharon S., 113 Cal. Rptr. at 116-120 (Kremer, P.J., dissenting); see
also Egelko, supra note 137 at AI.
233 See generally cases cited supra note 194.
234 San Diego Dept. of Public Welfare v. Superior Court of San Diego, 496 P.2d 453,
463 (Cal. 1972).
235 [d. at 463.
231

232
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Adoption Act should not hinder the California Supreme Court
in reaffirming the validity of the thousands of second-parent
adoptions that the superior courts granted.
C.

APPROACH CALIFORNIA SHOULD TAKE

The Sharon S. dissent correctly analyzed Marshall, but
failed to offer remedies for adoptions granted before the
changes to Section 9000 of the California Family Code.
Remedies are needed to curtail further challenges to secondparent adoptions. To prevent the potential reversal of secondparent adoption petitions granted by trial courts without
express statutory approval, the legislature should amend, and
retroactively apply, Section 8617 of the California Family Code.
Section 8617 of the California Family Code hinders secondparent adoptions. This section of the Family Code requires
that the birth parent terminate all parental rights' before the
adoption of the child. 236 Section 8617 currently reads: "The
birth parents of an adopted child are, from the time of the
adoption, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all
responsibility for, the adopted child, and have no right over the
child."237
In adoptions granted under the Independent
Adoption Act,238 birth parents 'have amended the adoption
statute so that full termination of parental rights does not
occur.239 Birth parents, like Sharon S. amend the petition so
the biological parents retain their pareI.'tal rights, much like in
stepparent adoptions. 24o
The California state legislature
should amend Section 8617 of the Family Code to read:
The birth parents of an adopted child are, from the time of the
adoption, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all
responsibility for, the adopted child, and have no right over
the child unless an addendum has been filed in the Superior
Court, prior to January 1, 2002, retaining the parental rights
of one of the minor's birth parents.

236
This does not apply to stepparent adoption where one birth parent retains
parental rights. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8548.
237
CAL. FAM CODE § 8617.
238
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8800-8823 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002).
239 See Sharon S., supra note 4, at 2-9 and 2002 WL 1926003, at * 7.
240 See id. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8548.
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This proposed changes explicitly applies to those adoptions
occurring before the changes to Section 9000 of the Family
Code implemented on January 1, 2002.241 The legislature
recognized the importance of fostering same-sex, second-parent
adoptions when it amended Section 9000 of the Family Code. 242
Retroactive application of a statute is not novel. The California
Supreme Court noted a family code provision could be
retroactively applied if it neither denied due process of the law
nor infringed upon a vested property right.243 While the court
did not apply the statute retroactively, it did not see lack of
express direction from the legislature as a bar.
A statute can be applied retroactively as long as it follows
legislative intent and does not violate due process of the law. 244
In Marriage of Buol, a California case, the legislature enacted
statutes amending designation of community and separate
property while the case was pending on appeal,245 The
legislature intended that the statute be retroactively applied
for dissolution proceedings occurring within a given time
frame. 246 The amended statute applied to the Buol dissolution
proceedings. 247 The court did not retroactively apply the
statute because retroactive application divested the wife of her
property right without due process of the law. 248 Should the
California legislature amend California Family Code § 8617,
retroactive application will not deprive the parties due process
of the law. Retroactive application will not adversely affect the
child's life and the continued adoption will provide emotional
and legal security to the child and assure the child continued
parental support.249 "The main purpose of adoption statutes is
the promotion of the welfare of children, bereft of the benefits
of the home and care of their real parents, by the legal
recognition and regulation of the consummation of the closest
conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and

241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000.
AB 25 Comm. Report, supra note 134.
Marriage of Heikes, 899 P.2d 1349, 1353 (Cal. 1995).
In re Marriage of Buol, 705 P.2d 354, 356-357 (Cal. 1985).
Id. at 356.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 357.

Adoption of EGG, 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 266 (listing factors used by the court
when deciding whether to grant a second-parent adoption).
249
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child."250 Further extension of the California adoption statute
would fulfill the aforementioned purpose of the adoption
statutes.
The dissent of In the Interest of Angel Lace M.,251 offers
insight into how California's courts can grant a second-parent
adoption without express statutory language. The dissent
noted the interest to the public in granting adoption-with the
decreasing number of children who live traditional in twoparent homes, a second-parent adoption would allow more
children to live in two-parent households. 252 The Wisconsin
adoption code contains a statute similar to Section 8617 of the
California Family Code. 253 The Wisconsin code stated, in part:
After the order of adoption is entered the relationship of
parent and child between the adopted person and the adoptive
person's birth parents, unless the birth parent is the spouse of
the adoptive parent, shall be completely altered and all the
rights, duties and other legal consequences of the relationship
shall cease to exist. 254
The dissenting judge looked to ways to interpret the
statute that would facilitate the best interest of the child in
light of the fact that the word shall was written into the
statute. 255 While shall implies that the object of the statute is
mandatory, the dissent interpreted the language . as
directory.256
The dissent examined four factors before
determining whether shall is directory or mandatory. The
dissent analyzed the statute's purpose, the statute's history,
the alternative outcomes of the adoption and penalties for
violation of the statute. 257 The Wisconsin legislature had
determined that adoptions should promote the best interest of
the child. 258 When the Angel Lace M. majority did not grant
the adoption, the dissent surmised that this did not fulfill the

Estate of Santos, 195 P. 1055, 1057 (Cal. 1921).
In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).
252 Id. at 689 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
253 See id. at 683 n.9 (citing sec. 48.92(2), Stats.) and Cal. Fam. Code § 8617.
254
See Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 683 n.9 (citing sec. 48.92(2), Stats.).
255 Id. at 690, 691.
256 Id. at 691.
257 Id. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Eby v. Kozarek, 153 Wis. 2d 75, 80, 450
N.W.2d 249 (1990) (quoting State v. Rosen, 72 Wis. 2d 200. 207, 240 N.W.2d 168
(1976».
258 Id. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
200

251
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legislative intent. 259 Because the majority did not fulfill the
legislative intent, the dissent concluded that shall in section
48.92 should be liberally construed as permissive rather than
mandatory.260
The dissent did not rely on its own proposition in
determining whether to bypass the language in the statute that
requires a court to sever the biological parent's parental rights.
261 In following the precedent set by the Vermont Supreme
Court262 and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Council,263
the Angel Lace M. dissent devised a means to grant the
adoption despite contrary language in the statute. 264 The
Wisconsin legislature mandated liberal construction of the
adoption statutes yet the majority did not grant· the same-sex,
second-parent adoption. 265
Whereas the Vermont and
Massachusetts legislatures did not mandate such liberal
construction and the courts nevertheless granted the same-sex,
second-parent adoptions. 266 Because the adoptions furthered
the best interest of the children, the Vermont and
Massachusetts courts chose to bypass the language in the
statutes requiring the severing of the biological parents' rights
toward the child. 267
The reasoning applied by the Wisconsin dissent would
allow an interpretation of the existing California Family Code
Section 8617 to permit same-sex, second-parent adoptions. The
reasoning would also allow the California legislature to
properly amend the statute to permit same-sex, second-parent
adoptions granted before January 1, 2002. Until such time
that the California legislature amends the adoption statute, a
judicial decree by the California Supreme Court permitting
second-parent adoptions will preserve the legal benefits the
[d. at 693 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
[d. at 691 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
261 [d. at 692 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
262 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (citing Adoption of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628
A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1995».
263 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) (citing Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315
(Mass. 1993».
264 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
265 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
266 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) citing Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315;
Adoption of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271)
267 [d. (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting) citing Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315;
Adoption of B.L.V.B. and E.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271).
259

260
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child currently enjoys. If the legislature does not amend
Section 8617, liberal construction of the adoption statutes still
allows the California courts to grant second-parent adoption
without express statutory language.
IV. CONCLUSION
Children may lose legal protections if the California
Supreme Court deems void the second-parent adoptions
granted before January 1, 2002. Finding these adoptions void
will harm the children at issue. In interpreting and applying
adoption statues, courts must look to the legislative intent and
the statutory language. If the adoption statute does not
expressly forbid the adoption sought and the adoption would
fulfill the legislative intent, the court should grant the
adoption. If courts strictly construe adoption statutes, they
deny children important benefits. Children would not be best
served by severing the legal relationship with one of their
parents.
Children are best served by enjoying legal
relationships with both the biological and nonbiological
parents.
The California Supreme Court should liberally construe
the adoption statutes in similar fashion to courts in
Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware, so that
thousands of children could retain the legal protections offered
by their second-parent. Currently, California expressly allows
same-sex, second-parents to adopt, but the statute does not
benefit those adoptions granted before January 1, 2002.
Liberally constructing the California adoption statutes would
not run against express statutory language and would promote
the best interest of the child-the primary concern of the
adoption statues.
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